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Defeasible reasoning is a kind of reasoning that is based on reasons that are ''defeasible,'' as opposed to the ''indefeasible'' reasons of deductive logic. Defeasible reasoning is a particular kind of non-demonstrative reasoning, where the reasoning does not produce a full, complete, or final demonstration of a claim, i.e., where fallibility and corrigibility of a conclusion are acknowledged. In other words defeasible reasoning produces a contingent statement or claim. Other kinds of non-demonstrative reasoning are probabilistic reasoning, inductive reasoning, statistical reasoning, abductive reasoning, and paraconsistent reasoning. Defeasible reasoning is also a kind of ampliative reasoning because its conclusions reach beyond the pure meanings of the premises. The differences between these kinds of reasoning correspond to differences about the conditional that each kind of reasoning uses, and on what premise (or on what authority) the conditional is adopted: * ''Deductive'' (from meaning postulate, axiom, or contingent assertion): if ''p'' then ''q'' (i.e., ''q'' or ''not-p'') * ''Defeasible'' (from authority): if ''p'' then (defeasibly) ''q'' * ''Probabilistic'' (from combinatorics and indifference): if ''p'' then (probably) ''q'' * ''Statistical'' (from data and presumption): the frequency of ''q''s among ''p''s is high (or inference from a model fit to data); hence, (in the right context) if ''p'' then (probably) ''q'' * ''Inductive'' (theory formation; from data, coherence, simplicity, and confirmation): (inducibly) "if ''p'' then ''q''"; hence, if ''p'' then (deducibly-but-revisably) ''q'' * ''Abductive'' (from data and theory): ''p'' and ''q'' are correlated, and ''q'' is sufficient for ''p''; hence, if ''p'' then (abducibly) ''q'' as cause Defeasible reasoning finds its fullest expression in jurisprudence, ethics and moral philosophy, epistemology, pragmatics and conversational conventions in linguistics, constructivist decision theories, and in knowledge representation and planning in artificial intelligence. It is also closely identified with prima facie (presumptive) reasoning (i.e., reasoning on the "face" of evidence), and ceteris paribus (default) reasoning (i.e., reasoning, all things "being equal"). == History == Though Aristotle differentiated the forms of reasoning that are valid for logic and philosophy from the more general ones that are used in everyday life (see dialectics and rhetoric), 20th century philosophers mainly concentrated on deductive reasoning. At the end of the 19th century, logic texts would typically survey both demonstrative and non-demonstrative reasoning, often giving more space to the latter. However, after the blossoming of mathematical logic at the hands of Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead and Willard van Orman Quine, latter-20th century logic texts paid little attention to the non-deductive modes of inference. There are several notable exceptions. John Maynard Keynes wrote his dissertation on non-demonstrative reasoning, and influenced the thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein on this subject. Wittgenstein, in turn, had many admirers, including the positivist legal scholar H.L.A. Hart and the speech act linguist John L. Austin, Stephen Toulmin in rhetoric (Chaim Perelman too), the moral theorists W.D. Ross and C.L. Stevenson, and the vagueness epistemologist/ontologist Friedrich Waismann. The etymology of ''defeasible'' usually refers to Middle English law of contracts, where a condition of defeasance is a clause that can invalidate or annul a contract or deed. Though ''defeat'', ''dominate'', ''defer'', ''defy'', ''deprecate'' and ''derogate'' are often used in the same contexts as ''defeasible,'' the verbs ''annul'' and ''invalidate'' (and ''nullify,'' ''overturn,'' ''rescind,'' ''vacate,'' ''repeal,'' ''debar'', ''void'', ''cancel'', ''countermand'', ''preempt'', etc.) are more properly correlated with the concept of defeasibility than those words beginning with the letter ''d''. Many dictionaries do contain the verb, ''to defease'' with past participle, ''defeased.'' Philosophers in moral theory and rhetoric had taken defeasibility largely for granted when American epistemologists rediscovered Wittgenstein's thinking on the subject: John Ladd, Roderick Chisholm, Roderick Firth, Ernest Sosa, Robert Nozick, and John L. Pollock all began writing with new conviction about how ''appearance as red'' was only a defeasible reason for believing something to be red. More importantly Wittgenstein's orientation toward language-games (and away from semantics) emboldened these epistemologists to manage rather than to expurgate ''prima facie'' logical inconsistency. At the same time (in the mid-1960s), two more students of Hart and Austin at Oxford, Brian Barry and David Gauthier, were applying defeasible reasoning to political argument and practical reasoning (of action), respectively. Joel Feinberg and Joseph Raz were beginning to produce equally mature works in ethics and jurisprudence informed by defeasibility. By far the most significant works on defeasibility by the mid-1970s were in epistemology, where John Pollock's 1974 ''Knowledge and Justification'' popularized his terminology of ''undercutting'' and ''rebutting'' (which mirrored the analysis of Toulmin). Pollock's work was significant precisely because it brought defeasibility so close to philosophical logicians. The failure of logicians to dismiss defeasibility in epistemology (as Cambridge's logicians had done to Hart decades earlier) landed defeasible reasoning in the philosophical mainstream. Defeasibility had always been closely related to argument, rhetoric, and law, except in epistemology, where the chains of reasons, and the origin of reasons, were not often discussed. Nicholas Rescher's ''Dialectics'' is an example of how difficult it was for philosophers to contemplate more complex systems of defeasible reasoning. This was in part because proponents of informal logic became the keepers of argument and rhetoric while insisting that formalism was anathema to argument. About this time, researchers in artificial intelligence became interested in non-monotonic reasoning and its semantics. With philosophers such as Pollock and Donald Nute (e.g., defeasible logic), dozens of computer scientists and logicians produced complex systems of defeasible reasoning between 1980 and 2000. No single system of defeasible reasoning would emerge in the same way that Quine's system of logic became a de facto standard. Nevertheless, the 100-year headstart on non-demonstrative logical calculi, due to George Boole, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Gottlob Frege was being closed: both demonstrative and non-demonstrative reasoning now have formal calculi. There are related (and slightly competing) systems of reasoning that are newer than systems of defeasible reasoning, e.g., belief revision and dynamic logic. The dialogue logics of Charles Hamblin and Jim Mackenzie, and their colleagues, can also be tied closely to defeasible reasoning. Belief revision is a non-constructive specification of the desiderata with which, or constraints according to which, epistemic change takes place. Dynamic logic is related mainly because, like paraconsistent logic, the reordering of premises can change the set of justified conclusions. Dialogue logics introduce an adversary, but are like belief revision theories in their adherence to deductively consistent states of belief. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「defeasible reasoning」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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